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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

In arriving at its conclusion, the court proceeds upon the intention of the testator, apart from the intention of the statute. The
court's position seems to be based on this ratiocination: Conceding
that the statute, by its terms, in effect intended to give an adopted
child the same status as the lawful issue of the adoptive parent, the
statute, nevertheless, cannot control the intention of the testator, and
if, notwithstanding the intention of the statute, the testator had a
different intention, then the intention of the testator must control.
Indeed, it would be like all rules of construction. The intention of
the testator must first be sought from the language of the will, unassisted by any rules of construction, and if, then, there is any doubt of
his intention, then only can rules of construction be invoked. If the
intention is clear without the assistance of outside aids, then those
have no place in the consideration. 2 If the argumentation is sound,
the conclusion arrived at in the case must also be sound, for the
court has found it to be the intention of the testator not to include
within that designation adopted children.
E. M. LEESMAN.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS
ADMIINISTRATION-JURISDICTION OF A PROBATE COURT WHERE
SUPPOSED DECEDENT

Is

IN

FACT

AmvE.-In

1894 the plaintiff

opened an account in the defendant bank, there being sundry transactions until shortly before the plaintiff's depafture for Ireland in
1897. Nothing further was heard from him, and in 1917 letters of
administration were issued to M, who duly qualified. Upon M's
demand the defendant bank paid to him the amount of the deposit
with interest. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff appeared and demanded payment of the same items, and on refusal commenced
this suit. In the circuit court judgment was given for the defendant on the ground that the policy of the courts of the state had been
shown in Plume v. Howard Savings Institution,' to be that payment
to an administrator duly appointed upon proof of the death and
intestacy of the person supposed to be dead, but who, it is later
learned, was actually alive at the time such letters were granted, is
an absolute discharge of the debt. The opinion of the circuit court,
with the reasons there given, was adopted, without further opinion,
by the unanimous vote of New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals:
Hamilton v. Orange Savings Bank.la
The first reference to the point under consideration seems to
have been in Allen v. Dundas,2 where the defendant had made payment to a duly appointed executor under a will later discovered
to be a forgery. This was held a good defense to a suit by the
administrator, bbt, it was added, had the decedent been alive, the
ecclesiastical court would have had no jurisdiction, and its whole
2. Aldendifer v. Wylie 306 IlL. 433, Hollenbauqh v. Smith 296 Il1. 561.
1. (1884) 46 N. J. Law 211.
la. (1924) 124 At. 62.
2. (1789) 3 T. R. 125.
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proceeding would have been a nullity. No such statement was called
for by the case, however. A similar dictum was expressed by
Marshall, C. J., in Griffith v. Frazier.3 Since then there have been
numerous decisions so holding, of which the first of any importance
was Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank.4 The most convincing
is Thomas v. People,5 but in general the arguments used are merely
an unsatisfactory repetition in varying words and forms of the conclusion already reached, viz., that the probate court has no jurisdiction except in the event of death, that the proceedings are a mere
nullity, etc. In the Jochuinsen case, when the possible hardship of
such a decision on innocent parties was urged, it was replied that
such was always the effect of holding decrees void for want of
jurisdiction, a contention better calculated, it would seem, for narrowing this undesirable result than for broadening it. More effective arguments may be found in a note by Mr. Redfield.a The
opposing authorities are very few in number. Besides those referred
to in the opinion in the instant case may be mentioned Scott v. McNeal." This case was carried to the United States Supreme Court,
where it was reversed on the ground that to hold the proceedings
valid as against the supposed decedent would be a deprivation of
property without due process of law.7
The tendency in general is to increase the powers of probate
courts and to make of them courts of limited jurisdiction, but not
inferior courts. 8 And this is in response to sound, practical considerations, all of which are fully operative here. Hence the early
enactment of statutes authorizing the probate courts to administer
upon the property, not only of deceased persons, but also of persons
shown to have been absent for a specified number of years. In'
Lavin v. Emigrant Industrial Bank9 it was held that a state statute
making conclusive the surrogate's determination of death was itself
a deprivation of property without due process, and beyond the
power of the state, there being no provision for notice of the proceeding, either by publication or by seizure of the thing itself. 10
In Carr v. Brown" provision was made for such publication; nevertheless it was believed to fall foul of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fortunately this was not the view adopted by the Supreme
Court in Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.12, which held that the
property of absentees might well be administered on, provided that
the statute call for suitable notice to the absentee as well as otherwise safeguard his interests as far as possible. Such judicial discussion as there has been since that case has dealt with the question
3.
4.
5.
5a.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

(1814) 12 U. S. 9 at 23.
(1861) 3 Allen (Mass.) 87.
(1883) 107 IIl. 517.
Am. L. Reg. XV 212.
(1892) 5 Wash. 309.
(1894) 154 U. S. 34.
Woerner "American Law of Administration" (3d ed. 1923) I 484.
(1880) 1 Fed. 641.
To the same effect see Clapp v. Houg (1904) 12 N. Dak. 600.
(1897) 20 R. I. 215.
(1905) 198 U. S. 458:
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whether particular statutes did or did not provide such sufficient
safeguards.' 3 The instant case, however, contains no reference to
the state statutes governing the administration of absentees' property.14 It treats the question as being solely of the power of a.
probate court conclusively to establish the fact of death, without in
any way resting its jurisdiction simply on the independent ground
of unexplained absence. To this extent it would appear to be a
throw-back to a view no longer open since the decision in Scott v.
E. W. PUTTKAMMER.
McNeal."
BILLS AND NOTES-QUASI-CONTRACT-MISTAKE BY DRAWEE
AS TO GENUINENESS OF DRAWER'S SIGNATURE.-What are the

rights of a drawee bank which pays to a non-negligent holder in due
course a check whereon the signature of the drawer is forged?
Since the check is not the order of the person whose name appears
as drawer, it cannot be charged to his account' unless the payment
results from a breach of his duty to the bank-as, for instance, in
failing to use reasonable care in promptly discovering and reporting
previous forgeries of his name.2 Upon quasi-contractual principles
it would seem that the bank ought to be able to recover the amount
from the holder. For the money is paid under a mistake of fact,
and the payee, receiving money of the bank to which he is neither
legally nor equitably entitled, should make restitution. But Lord
Mansfield, in the familiar case of Price v. Neal,3 established the rule
that the drawee cannot recover, a rule which, it is now generally
agreed, rests on considerations of business policy.4 Although generally followed in America, this rule, before the adoption of the
uniform Negotiable Instruments law, had been rejected in three
states-in Pennsylvania, by statute,5 and in North Dakota8 andt
Oklahoma7 by judicial decision.
In the Negotiable Instruments law the question, it must beconfessed, is not dealt with in a very satisfactory way. Section 62'
provides that the acceptor, by accepting the instrument, admits,
13. Nelson v. Blinn (1908) 197 Mass. 279 (affirmed, 1911, 222 U. S. 1);.
Selden v. Kennedy (1906) 104 Va. 826.

14. N. J. Comp. Sts. 1910, pp. 3823 and 3824 sec. 30 and 32. Also Acts;
of 1912 ch. 324 sec. 3.
15. (1894) 154 U. S. 34.
1. McCarthy v. First National Bank (1920) 204 Ala. 424, 85 So. 754;
Jain v. London and S. F. Bank (1891) 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac..1100; Morgan v.
United States Mtg. and Trust Co. (1913) 208 N. Y. 218, 101 N. E. 871;
Denbigh v. First National Bank (1918) 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475.
2. First National Bank v. Allen (1893) 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335; National
Dredging Co. v. Bank (Del. 1908) 6 Penn. 580; Critten v. Chemical National

Bank (1902) 171 N. Y. 219.

3. (1762) 3 Burr. 1354. For cases accord, see 7 C. J. 688, note 5.
4. See Germania Bank v. Boutell (1895) 60 Minn. 189, 62 N. W. 327.
5. See People's Savings Bank v. Cupps (1879) 91 Pa. 315. See also the
Act of April 27. 1909, amending sec. 137 of the Neg. Inst. Law.
6. First National Bank v. Bank of Wyndmere (1906) 15 N. D. 299,
108 N. W. 546.
7. American Express Co. v. State National Bank (1911) 27 Oki. 824,
113 Pac. 711.

